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COUNTERSTATEMENT OF ISSUES PRESENTED ON APPEAL 
As a result of the trial held May 5, 1986, before the 
Honorable John A. Rokich, Third District Court Judge, Henry Earl 
Sartori, Appellant, has requested this Court review three issues 
on appeal which Respondent would restate as follows: 
1. Was Appellant prohibited from presenting any evi-
dence to the Trial Court on the issue of which party was respon-
sible for the dental expenses of the minor children; and, if so, 
would the trial result have been different? 
2. Was Appellant restricted by the Court in presenting 
any evidence on Respondent's financial circumstances and, if so, 
would the trial result have been different? 
3. Was the increase in child support from $100.00 per 
month to $250.00 per month after an 11 year span of time 
an abuse of discretion on the facts as presented? 
COUNTERSTATEMENT OF FACTS 
A, Overview; Statement of the Case, 
After eight years of marriage, the parties to this 
action were divorced by order of the Third District Court on 
March 17, 1976. Plaintiff/Respondent, Mrs. Spearsf was awarded 
custody of the parties' two minor children who were ages three 
and seven at the time of the divorce and Defendant/Appellant, 
Mr. Sartori, was ordered to pay One Hundred and No/100 Dollars 
($100.00) per month per child as child support. (Decree of 
Divorce appears in record, hereinafter "R" , at page 22). 
The Decree of Divorce contains a provision for payment 
of medical obligations which appears as follows: 
"8. The Defendant is ordered to payf in ad-
dition to the child support, all medical obli-
gations of the minor children." (R. 23) 
Plaintiff's Divorce Complaint had requested that Defendant pay 
"all of the medical and dental obligations of the minor children" 
(paragraph 10, Plaintiff's Complaint, R. 4). The record also 
contains a comprehensive Stipulation between the parties, to wit: 
"10. That Defendant shall pay all of the medi-
cal obligations of the minor children." (R. 18) 
There are no other references in either the Complaint or the par-
ties' Stipulation allocating the responsibility for payment of 
medical or dental expenses. Moreover, the Findings of Fact, Con-
clusions of Lawf and the Decree of Divorce itself contain no ref-
erence to dental expenses and the only provision for the health 
care of the minor children is the directive in the Decree that 
Defendant "shall pay all of the medical obligations of the minor 
children." (R. 18). 
In August, 1985, Respondent Jeri H. Sartori Spears filed 
a Verified Petition for Modification of Decree of Divorce which 
requested the following relief: 
(a) An increase in child support for the parties1 minor 
children who were then age thirteen (13) and sixteen (16); 
(b) An extension of the child support obligation for 
the parties' eldest child/ Henry Sartori, Jr., to continue until 
he reached the age of 19 when he would graduate from high school; 
and for, 
(c) Reimbursement from Mr. Sartori for amounts expended 
on behalf of the minor children, representing medical and dental 
obligations from 1977 until the date of filing, which totaled 
over $6,000.00. (Respondent's Verified Petition appears at R. 
24). 
A hearing was held on this Petition to Modify before 
Domestic Relations Commissioner Sandra N. Peuler on December 9, 
1985. At that time the Commissioner requested that both parties 
submit documentary evidence in support of their position on the 
medical expense issue. Mrs. Spears submitted an itemized summary 
of amounts expended by her for prescriptions, general medical ex-
penses, and orthodontic work for the minor children from 1977 
through 1985. (R. 59-62). Mr. Sartori submitted copies of 
checks, receipts, and check registers, of which only two were 
directly related to medical reimbursement during the time for 
which Mrs. Spears was seeking reimbursement, and these totaled 
$33.50. (R. 66-72). Mrs. Spears Financial Declaration showed 
her only income to be child support in the sum of $200.00 per 
month. (R. 82-84). Mr. Sartori's Financial Declaration showed 
significant rental income from his ownership of rental proper-
ties, and salaried income, which together totaled $44,544.00 
annual income. (R. 85-93). 
On January 14, 1986, the Commissioner ruled that Plain-
tiff should be granted an increase in child support for her 
youngest child, Shanell, from $100.00 to $250.00 per month 
beginning February, 1986. The Commissioner also awarded 
Plaintiff judgment for unreimbursed medical, dental, and ortho-
dontic bills upon both counsel comparing their evidence of pay-
ment and achieving an exact dollar amount. (R. 94-95). 
Mr. Sartori objected to the Commissioner's recommen-
dations and the matter was set for trial. 
On May 5, 1986, a trial was held before the Honorable 
John A. Rokich, whose order upheld the recommendation of the 
Domestic Relations Commissioner and awarded Mrs. Spears judgment 
for unreimbursed medical, dental, and orthodontic expenses in the 
amount of $5,971.32; the amount of $1,000.00 in attorney's fees 
and costs; and an increase in child support for the minor child, 
Shanell, to $250.00 per month as of February, 1986. (R. 103, 
115-117). 
The Court found that a substantial change of circum-
stances had been established as Mr. Sartori's income had 
increased significantly from the "$800.00 per month net wages" 
set forth in the Divorce Decree to his current income of over 
$40,000.00 gross annual income, and further found that the expen-
ses of raising the minor children had also increased for Mrs. 
Spears. 
B. Facts on Medical-Dental Reimbursement Issue. 
At the outset of the trial, the Court informed the par-
ties and counsel that it had reviewed the pleadings and Commis-
sioner's recommendations and was prepared to find that as a mat-
ter of law, the divorce Decree provision that Mr. Sartori pay 
"all the medical obligations of the minor children" included all 
of the medical and dental expenses for the minor children. The 
Court referred to the Complaint, Stipulation, and Divorce Decree 
in making this statement. (Trial Transcript, at R. 145-146). 
The Court then phrased the medical expense issue for trial as a 
determination of which amounts were still owed to Mrs. Spears 
which had not already been paid by insurance or reimbursed by Mr. 
Sartori (R. 146). During trial, Respondent, Mrs. Spears, pre-
sented evidence including checks and insurance records from 1977 
through 1985, showing her payments to physicians, dentists, and 
orthodontists for her children's health care needs. Respondent's 
records showed these payments had not been reimbursed by the 
Appellant or any insurance provider. Appellant, Henry Sartori, 
also presented testimony and evidence to establish some reimbur-
sement of medical payments during this time period. At the end 
of this testimony the Court determined that it would order reim-
bursement to Respondent of at least $3,700.00 paid for orthodon-
tic work on behalf of the minor children, but could not 
determine, on the evidence before it, what portion of the 
remaining $2,500.00 of general medical expenses requested by Re-
spondent should be paid, if any. The Court provided counsel a 
week within which to meet outside of Court to exchange evidence 
on this point and determine a mutually acceptable amount for 
reimbursement. This was done, and judgment was ultimately 
awarded to Respondent for $5,791.00, representing unreimbursed 
expenses for medical, dental and orthodontic expenses. 
C. Facts on Child Support Increase. 
Based on a review of the pleadings, the Court file and 
evidence presented, the Court determined that Defendant's net 
wages at the time of the divorce in 1975 was $800.00 per month 
and that Appellant had a present gross annual income of over 
$30,000.00. These figures were both agreed to by counsel in open 
Court. (R. 175). Respondent, Jeri H. Sartori Spears, testified 
that she was employed at the time of the divorce in 1975 as a 
waitress and last worked, at this same occupation, in about 1978. 
(R. 175). She also testified that she would like to work but 
felt she had a "full time job taking care of my children". (R. 
195). Respondent further testified that it had been a financial 
hardship for her to pay the medical and dental bills for the 
minor children without any assistance from Appellant. (R. 176-
195). 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS 
I 
Appellant contends that the Trial Court prohibited him 
from presenting evidence on the parties' Stipulation as to pay-
ment of medical and dental expenses, and further, that he was 
prohibited from cross-examining Plaintiff as regards her current 
employment and financial situation. As a review of the record 
reveals, there was no prohibition, limitation, or other restric-
tion on Appellant's counsel presenting his case or questioning 
witnesses. Rather, counsel made no objection during trial to any 
such limitations and has thus lost the right to raise these mat-
ters on appeal. Further, the Court's ruling to interpret the 
language of the parties' Divorce Decree referring to payment of 
medical obligations, which the Court determined as a matter of 
law also included dental and orthodontic expenses, is within the 
sound discretion of the Trial Court and was based on competent 
evidence and supported by law. 
II 
Appellant further argues that the Trial Court abused its 
discretion in raising Appellant's child support obligation to 
$250.00 per month "without any evidence other than Defendant-
Respondent's increased income". There was in fact ample and sub-
stantial evidence in the record of Respondent's lack of income 
and greater child-rearing expenses to support the increase in 
child support as directed by the Court. A significant body of 
case law supports the Court's action which was also guided by 
concepts of equity and fairness. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
THE COURT DID NOT ABUSE ITS DISCRETION IN RULING 
THAT DIVORCE DECREE PROVISIONS REFERRING TO 
"MEDICAL EXPENSES" ALSO INCLUDED DENTAL AND 
ORTHODONTIC EXPENSES IN THIS CASE. 
A. The Court Had Significant Evidence and Equitable 
Power to Support its Ruling. 
The long-recognized standard of appellate review permits 
reversal of a Trial Court only when the evidence clearly prepon-
derates to the contrary or where the trial Court has abused its 
discretion or misapplied principles of law. Gill v. Gill, 719 
P.2d 779 (Utah 1986); Wiese v. Wiese, 699 P.2d 700 (Utah 1985); 
Fletcher v. Fletcher, 615 P.2d 1218 (Utah 1980). All of the 
available facts and evidence on the issue of whether these par-
ties' intended the phrase "medical obligations" in the Divorce 
Decree to also include dental, orthodontic and similar obliga-
tions was before the Court. The Court explicitly referred 
to this evidence both at the beginning and close of the trial 
stating that it had read the Complaint, Decree and Stipulation of 
the parties and was of the opinion that both medical and dental 
expenses were meant to be included as health care costs and were 
directed to be paid by Defendant-Appellant Henry Earl Sartori. 
(R. 145f 225). There was also directly conflicting testimony 
elicited by both parties as to what was intended by the phrase 
"medical obligations". (R. 147, 212). Appellant's counsel 
called no other witnesses on the interpretation of this point and 
the Court thus had before it all factual evidence on the parties' 
intent. Accordingly, the Court was in a position to then apply 
its equitable powers and rules of construction to interpret the 
Divorce Decree. The Court ruled that both medical and dental 
expenses were included as health care to be paid by Appellant on 
behalf of the minor children. 
The Court's reasoning is expressed as follows: 
"I am of the opinion that I heretofore stated 
that the medical and dental is included as health 
care and it is not conceivable that a parent 
would be required to pay the medical expenses 
out of the $100.00 per month and try to raise 
children on that amount....but from 1975 to 1986, 
11 years, [child support] has not increased. So, 
it appears to be only fair that the medical will 
be paid, and particularly the orthodontic will be 
paid by you, Mr. Sartori. I feel very strongly 
about that. That is a health care problem that 
they had..." (R. 225-226). 
This is a strong and clear articulation by the Trial Court that 
in the Court's view, the child support level was too low to be 
intended to include payment by Mrs. Spears of the minor 
childrens1 health care expenses. A clear sense of manifest 
injustice at the situation of Apellant's inadequate contribution 
to his children's needs is also apparent and important to this 
ruling. 
B. Appellant Failed to Timely Object or Proffer 
Evidence at Trial, In his Brief, Appellant argues that the trial 
court limited his case presentation on the issue of medical/den-
tal reimbursement. A careful examination of the trial transcript 
reveals JTO attempts by Appellant's counsel to proffer evidence on 
this point or to present relevant witnesses. Instead, Appellant 
makes bold statements in his Brief that the evidence on this 
point "would have included a comparison between the; divorce 
Complaint, the Stipulation, Defendant's testimony and also the 
testimony of Defendant's divorce attorney". Without an 
appropriate and timely objection or proffer at the trial, 
Appellant cannot be allowed to accuse the Court of an abuse of 
discretion and of limiting his presentation when he in fact made 
no efforts to present other evidence or preserve his client's 
rights. 
Appellant also tries to make us believe that he had some 
secret explanation for why he is only obligated to pay the medi-
cal expenses of the children and not the dental. A careful 
review of Appellant's Brief still preserves this secret as no 
basis, either factual or legal, is presented to argue against the 
trial court's ruling. The testimony on this point was in direct 
conflict and the documents which this Court and the Trial Court 
have to review shed no light on who, other than Mr. Sartori, 
Defendant-Appellant herein, is to be responsible for dental and 
other health care expenses of the children. Appellant cannot be 
allowed to lay blame on the trial court for its own failure to 
present a case. Rather, the Court had before it all available 
evidence on the interpretation of the divorce Decree as to medi-
cal and dental expenditures and ruled in accordance with the law 
and equitable principles. 
The Trial Court's ruling to include both medical and 
dental expenses in the Divorce Decree language which uses the 
general phrase "medical obligations" is supported by substantial 
evidence and legal precedent. In the case of Naylor v. Naylor, 
700 P.2d 707 (Utah 1985), the Utah Supreme Court clarifies the 
extent of a Trial Court's broad equitable discretion, stating 
that it has the power to even "disregard stipulations or agree-
ment of the parties in the first instance...and to thereafter 
modify such judgments when change of circumstances justifies it, 
regardless of attempts of the parties to control the matter by 
contract." 700 P.2d at 710. Thus, even if this Court had been 
convinced that the parties intended to stipulate differently, it 
still had the authority to override that stipulation in the in-
terests of justice. An example of the Court's power in the area 
of medical expenses and insurance is presented in the case of 
Beardall v. Beardall, 629 P.2d 425 (Utah 1981). In that case, 
the Utah Supreme Court interpreted a Divorce Decree provision 
providing for Defendant's payment of medical and dental expenses 
of minor children whose custody was awarded to plaintiff. 
Plaintiff brought a proceeding to enforce this provision and also 
requested reimbursement for the medical insurance premiums 
expended by her over the years on behalf of the minor children in 
her custody. The Utah Supreme Court affirmed the Trial Court's 
reimbursement of these premiums stating that the premiums were 
actually a necessary medical expense incurred for the children. 
Similarly, the Court here has found that the orthodontic expen-
ditures were medically necessary procedures and thus could con-
ceivably be awarded under the explicit provision in the Divorce 
Decree that medical expenses be reimbursed by Appellant. 
C. The Orthodontic Expense Was Medically Necessary. 
It was also established at trial that the minor 
children's orthodontic work was medically necessary and thus 
unquestionably a payment Appellant should pay under the Decree. 
During the 11 years of divorce Mrs. Spears was essentially paying 
all of the health care costs of the minor children which included 
payment of $3,700.00 for orthodontic bills. Mrs. Spears 
testified that these orthodontic expenses were for both of the 
minor children and were in fact medically necessary procedures. 
She testified that it was the childrens' pediatrician who 
referred them for orthodontic work and described the extreme den-
tal condition of both children prior to this corrective work. 
She testified her son Henry could not close his mouth or chew his 
food and was the object of frequent teasing as a result of his 
prominent teeth. She further testified that her son would gag at 
the dinner table because he could not chew properly and that it 
also impaired his breathing. These conditions also existed with 
her daughter, Shannell, who had a distorted jawbone structure 
which prevented her chewing and breathing properly. (R. 
165-168). Photographs and a statement from the orthodontist con-
firmed that these orthodontic expenses were not cosmetic proce-
dures but, rather, were medically necessary and directly related 
to the childrens' health and well-being. The Court also made 
this finding. (R. 226.) 
POINT II 
IT WAS NOT AN ABUSE OF DISCRETION FOR THE 
TRIAL COURT TO AWARD AN INCREASE IN CHILD SUPPORT 
ON THE BASIS OF A CHANGE OF CIRCUMSTANCES. 
The law is clear that a party seeking a modification of 
a Divorce Decree carries the burden of showing a substantial 
change in circumstances. Christensen v. Christensen, 628 P.2d 
1297 (Utah 1981). This Court has further emphasized that in mat-
ters concerning child custody and the support of children, be-
cause of their highly equitable nature, that it is appropriate 
for the Trial Court to take into consideration the entire cir-
cumstances of the case and make "any adjustment" which the Trial 
Court "may think fair and justified using equitable powers". 
Lord v. Shaw, 682 P.2d 853 (Utah 1984). 
It is unclear whether Appellant is arguing that the 
threshold burden of changed circumstances has or has not been 
established herein. Rather, there is only a generalized state-
ment in Appellant's Brief that the Court was "without sufficient 
information of the parties' circumstances upon which to base a 
modification of the Decree." (Appellant's Brief, page 8). 
Nevertheless, Appellant's main argument appears to again be a 
belief that the trial court restricted his case presentation and 
questioning of Plaintiff's circumstances. Once again, a thorough 
examination of the record fails to show any point where 
Appellant's attorney was "prohibited" from questioning or where a 
proffer of evidence or additional witnesses was made. It is 
accurate that at one point Respondent's counsel's objection to 
questioning was sustained by the Court where Mrs. Spears was 
being questioned on purchases her present husband made. (R. 
196). The Court explained its ruling indicating that it was the 
parties he was concerned with and their change of circumstances, 
not their spouses. This ruling has a firm basis in Utah law and 
was dealt with by the Supreme Court in the matter of Kiesel v. 
Kiesel, 619 P.2d 1374 (Utah 1980). In that appeal the Court 
faced the issue of whether income earned by a party's new spouse 
was properly considered in a modification proceeding. The Court 
stated as follows: 
"While it is true that a stranger to a divorce 
action should not be constrained, by reason of 
marriage, to lend financial support to his or 
her spouse's children by a prior marriage, the 
Court is not precluded from taking such circum-
stances into consideration in determining the 
ability of one who does have the legal obliga-
tion of support." 
619 P.2d at 1376. 
In this passage, the Supreme Court is expressing the traditional 
"deference to the judgment of the trial court due to its advan-
taged position". Openshaw v« Openshaw, 639 P.2d at 178 (Utah 
1981). 
In facing issues presented by modification petitions, 
the Courts have wide latitude to review all the circumstances of 
the parties to determine whether sufficient changes have occurred 
warranting modification and also to determine what precise modi-
fication should be made. There is no dogmatic checklist for 
Courts to follow to assess the circumstances in every case. In 
the case of Owen v. Owen, 579 P.2d 911 (Utah 1978)f this Court 
approved the Trial Court's emphasis on the needs of the children 
rather than the manner and standard of living desired by a parent 
as being the proper focus of an inquiry requesting increased 
child support. In the case of Wiker v. Wikery 600 P.2d 514 (Utah 
1978), this Court reviewed an increase in support in a situation 
of continued illness of the custodial mother, salary increases of 
the noncustodial father, and also cited the factors of infla-
tionary trends and the lapse of time between awards as sufficient 
to uphold a Trial Court's increase in support. The Kiesel case 
presented very similar facts to the case at bar, namely, an 
increased income for the noncustodial father and increased medi-
cal expenses for the minor children which this Court found was 
sufficient evidence to support an increased support award. 
Similar facts to Respondents are also seen in Christiansen v. 
Christiansen, 667 P.2d 592 (Utah, 1983), where an increased 
support award was affirmed on a trial record showing only a non-
custodial father's increased income and increased expenses for 
the minor childrens' child care. Interestingly, Appellant quotes 
from this case to the effect that an increase in a husband's 
income does not "automatically" justify an increase in child sup-
port. No such "automatic" view is urged by Respondent, rather 
the facts of her situation present several well-established 
grounds to justify the child-support increase awarded by the 
court below. 
In the instant case, Mr. Sartori admits that there was 
evidence of his substantially increased income from $800.00 per 
month at the time of the divorce in 1975 to a gross annual income 
of over $30/000.00 per year at the time of trial 11 years later. 
(R. 175.) Appellant also admits in his Brief that there was no 
evidence of any increased income for Mrs. Spears. (Appellant's 
Brief, page 8, line 16). There was also unquestionably evidence 
before the Court as to Mrs. Spears' increased expenses regarding 
the medical, dental and health care expenses of the minor 
children. These alone approximated $6f000.00 during a nine-year 
period. She also testified to substantial extra costs for her 
son, Henry's special diet needs, and extra expenses (R. 163, 164, 
176). An important factor in Respondent's situation, too, is the 
mere passage of time where 11 years of inflation has undercut the 
value of her 1975 $100.00 per child support level. Respondent's 
unemployment and the prolonged financial hardship caused by 
meeting the burden of her children's substantial medical and den-
tal expenses alone should also be considered. These circumstan-
ces not only pass the threshold test to allow modification herein 
but also provide substantial support for the amount of the 
increase awarded. 
The Trial Court was in fact quite explicit in explaining 
its increased support award herein and appeared to view the 
situation as patently unfair for far too long to Plaintiff-
Respondent. Considering Mr. Sartori's $45,000.00 annual income 
and the $100.00 per child support level/ the Court was clearly 
offended by the notion that Mrs. Spears was entitled to no 
increase. 
CONCLUSION 
The Trial Court did not abuse its discretion in either 
interpreting the divorce Decree/ awarding increased child sup-
port/ in handling the trial, or in making rulings of law as set 
forth above. Appellant has failed to establish any error andf as 
shown/ the trial court's decision is supported by ample evidence 
and equitable principles, and should be affirmed. 
DATED this (& day of March/ 1987. 
/Ar/u? h'c 
SUZANNE M^ftELIUS 
Attorney 'for Plaintiff-Respondent 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
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of the foregoing Brief of Respondent to Harry Caston, Attorney 
for Defendant/Appellant, McKAYf BURTON & THURMAN, Kennecott 
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